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MOST of the Corn Belt is located within the five states of Ohio,
Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Missouri, though some of it spills
over into contiguous states (see the color map in the back of the
book). Because of the favorable combination of soils, topog-
raphy, and climate that makes the area suitable for intensive
crop and livestock farming, these five states contain a remarkable
concentration of the nation's agricultural wealth (Figure 31).
In 1930 (the midpoint of the interwar period on which our
study concentrates) they accounted for 25 percent of the value
of all farm real estate, livestock, and equipment in the United
The Corn Belt states also account for a sizable proportion of
the nation's farm mortgage debt. When the debt reached its
peak in 1923, farm mortgage loans in the Corn Belt states
amounted to $3.3 billion, or about 30 percent of the totaL2 Al-
though the outstanding debt in the five states has shrunk greatly
since that time, it still aggregated about one-fifth of the total for
the nation at the beginning of Hence mortgage loan ex-
perience in the Corn Belt during the twenties and thirties was
highly significant for farmers, lenders, and the economy at
large.
Physical Characteristics
The Corn Belt has an excellent climate for crop production.
Average annual rainfall ranges from around 26 inches in the
northwest corner of Iowa to over 45 inches in some parts of the
Ohio and Missouri River valleys (Figure 25, Chapter 2). The
occasional dry spells are seldom serious, and are not comparable
to the devastating droughts that occur from time to time in
the Great Plains and Mountain region. Furthermore, adequate
rainfall is usually associated with a long, hot growing season,
necessary for good corn yields.
Like other parts of the country, the Corn Belt has soils that
1 Statistical A bstract of the United States: 1935, p. 560.
2 Donald C. Horton, Harald C. Larsen, and Norman J. Wall, Farm.Mortgage
Credit Facilities in the United States(U.S. Department of Agriculture, Misc.
Pub. No. 478, 1942), p. 220.
8 Agricultural Finance Review (Bureau of Agricultural Economics), Vol. 15,
Supplement May Table 17, p. 27.78 THE CORN BELT
vary widely in productivity. Topography likewise varies from
the level prairie of central Illinois and Iowa to the rough and
hilly country along the Ohio River. The more productive areas
lie in western Ohio, central Indiana, central and northern Illi-
nois, and northern and western Iowa (Figure 32).Theyare
almost entirely in glaciated territory, and the soils are younger
geologically and much richer in humus content than those
farther south. Since the land is level, or nearly so, it is relatively
free from erosion and adapted to efficient machine methods of
production, but much of it requires drainage.
Figure 32.Soil Productivity in the Corn Belt
Based on general productivity of soil association groups adjusted according to long-term
overage corn yields, overoge land values per acre, aridvarioussoils data published by
the state agricultural experiment stations. The areas of best soils ore rated "first," of
poorest, "fifth."
Thesouthern sections of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, which
border on the Ohio River, contain much poor land. Most of it
is unglaciated, and in many localities the soils are residual sand-
stone and shale, with low fertility. The subsoils are often im-
pervious and the drainage inadequate, so that in wet weather
the topsoil becomes waterlogged, and in dry weather the hard
layer prevents contact between the roots and the subsoil mois-
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from rolling to rough and broken, thus limiting the proportion
of land that can be put into crops and affecting the ease with
which land can be tilled and crops harvested. Erosion is a serious
hazard, and in some sections of southern Ohio it has caused so
much damage that crop farming has been discontinued and oc-
casionally farms have been abandoned. Naturally, the unfavor-
able conditions in the Ohio valley have had a pronounced effect
on type of farming. Strictly speaking, the section does not be-
long to the Corn Belt, although it produces some corn. It is
more an area of general farming, with many small farms of the
self-sufficing or part-time type.
There is also a sizable area of comparatively poor land in
southern Iowa and northern Missouri. In southern Iowa the
topography is generally rough, cropland is scarce, and yields are
relatively low. There, too, erosion is a serious hazard, and in
many areas much of the topsoil is gone. In northeastern Missouri
the topography is smoother, but the soils are rather infertile,
and the subsoil is typically impervious, which affects production
adversely in both wet and dry periods. The large area of the
Ozarks in southern Missouri is also poor, and, in the main,
suitable only for subsistence farming.
Types of Farming
Corn and livestock are the two basic farm enterprises in the
Corn Belt. Although large amounts of corn are produced for
sale outside the region, most of the crop is used within the Corn
Belt for raising or fattening livestock. Numerous other crops
are grown—for example, wheat, oats, soybeans, and hay—in
most cases as part of a rotation with corn. Dairying occurs in
conjunction with corn and livestock in many areas.
Within the Corn Belt, combinations of enterprise vary con-
siderably from farm to farm. Some farms specialize, usually
either in cash grains or in growing or fattening livestock. Most
farms, however, engage in a combination of enterprises. To some
extent the different combinations of enterprises, or types of
farm, are located in specific areas. In central Iowa and central
Illinois, cash corn and small grains are important sources of
income. In the Missouri valley area of the region, which in-
cludes parts of Iowa and Nebraska, and again in the Mississippi
valley area, which includes parts of Illinois and Iowa, livestock
raising and fattening predominate.80 THE CORN BELT
Speculative Inflation of Land Values
The most significant characteristic of the World War I boom
in the Corn Belt was its greater impact on the westerly sections
than on the east. By states, the increase between igio and 1920
in average value of farm real estate per acre ranged from 64
percent in Ohio to 136 percent in Iowa (Table io). The in-
crease in dollar amount for Iowa was from $96 to $227.
The expansion of farm mortgage debt during the same decade
was even more marked. The 176 percent rise for Iowa was again
TABLE 10
Average Value of Farm Real Estate per Acre








Ohio $69 $113 64%
Indiana 75 126 68
Illinois io8 i88 74
Iowa 96 227 136
Missouri 5° 88 76
United States $69 72%
Data for the states are from the i6th Census: 1940, Agriculture, Vol. i, Parts
iand2. Figures for the United States are from Agricultural Statistics) 1948
(U.S. Department of Agriculture), page 528.
the largest for the region (Table i i). In some sections, par-
ticularly in the west, the debt expansion was caused in part by
an increase in the proportion of farms mortgaged. Of most im-
portance, however, was the rise in the average debt per farm.
Estimates compiled by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics
show increases in the average size of new mortgages between
1917 and 1920 ranging between 49 andpercent for all the
Corn Belt states except Iowa, where the increase was 6g percent.
That brought the average size of new loans in Iowa in 1920
to the high level of $i i,o8o, when the United States average
was
An abundance of credit made the debt expansion possible.
Much of the credit was attracted from outside sources by the
general feeling of optimism over the future of Corn Belt agri-
4AverageSize of Farm.Mortgage Recordings of Selected Lender Groups (Bureau
of Agricultural Economics, mimeo., November 1940), pp. 22if., and 28 f.THE CORN BELT 81
TABLE 11
Farm Mortgage Debt in the Corn Belt States,
igio and 1920
(dollar figures in thousands)
Increase





















TotalCornBelt $1,133,480 $2,584,057 128%
United States $3,207,863 $8,448,772 163%
From Farm-Mortgage Credit Facilities in the United States, by Donald C.
Horton, Harald C. Larsen, and Norman J. Wall (U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Misc. Pub. No. 478, 1942),pages219 f. Data as of January 1.
culture.Life insurance companies were heavy lenders in the
region because of the opportunity of making large-sized loans
on good farm land. Eastern mortgage companies were active
as well. The competition of numerous lenders for farm loans
was not always conducive to sound lending.
Great expansion also occurred in the local credit and banking
system, particularly in the western Corn Belt. In Iowa the num-
ber of banks increased from 1,455 to 1,676 between 1914 and
1919. By June 1920 there were 1,763 active banks—more than
in any other state.5 Furthermore, there was an abundance of
second mortgage money from regular lenders as well as from
sellers who took a mortgage as part of the sales price. Thus credit
inflation made it possible for farm operations to expand, for
land values to rise to high levels, and for farmers to incur debt
burdens that could be carried only with the continuation of
highly favorable farm incomes. Naturally, there were many fore-
closures and forced sales when the commodity markets eventu-
ally broke.
The causes of the Iowa land boom are difficult to explain_
as difficult as the stock market and Florida real estate booms of
the twenties. Fundamentally, of course, Iowa contains as much
high grade land as any other place of similar size in the world.
5Bankingand Monetary Statistics (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Table 8, p. 26; Comptroller of the Currency, Annual Report for
1920 (Treasury Department), Vol. 1,p.256.82 THE CORN BELT
TABLE 12
World War I Inflation and Subsequent Debt Distress
in the Corn Belt States
Average distress
Increase in In crease in transfers1 1925-34,
farm mort- land vatues per i,00o mort-
gage debt, per acre, gaged farms
State 7910 to7920 1910 to7920 in 1930
Ohio 97% 64% 47.6
Indiana 68 49.1
Illinois g8 74 57.6
Missouri 76 66.i
Iowa 176 136 72.5
From Tables io and ii, and Figure 7.
A large proportion of the land can be planted to crops; soils
are generally good; there are few climatic hazards; and yields
are high year after year. Moreover, land values and farm in-
comes had been rising almost continuously since igoo. All this
justified confidence in Iowa's future, but not the extreme opti-
mism that actually developed. Much the same favorable con-
ditions existed in other Corn Belt states, but the boom was far
less extreme. A summary comparison of World War I land and
credit inflation with subsequent debt distress in the Corn Belt
states is shown in Table i2.
The Price Collapse
The collapse in agricultural prices and incomes that occurred
in 1921 was severe in the Corn Belt, but not much more so than
in the nation at large. Between 1919and1921, decreases in the
price index of all farm products ranged from 3g percent in Ohio
to 50percentin Iowa (Table 13).Thesecompare with 42per-
cent for the entire United States.
The collapse in agricultural prices after 1929 was more severe.
By 1932, farm prices in Ohio and Illinois were 58 percent below
the 1929 level; and in Missouri, Iowa, and Indiana the declines
were 59, 6o, and 6i percent, respectively. These all exceeded
the decline of 54 percent for the United States as a whole. Farm
cash receipts, however, do not necessarily increase or decrease
by the same percentage as farm prices, since production also
affects receipts. Production actually increased in the Corn Belt
during the period under review; consequently, receipts de-THE CORN BELT 83
TABLE 13
Index Numbers of Agricultural Prices in the Corn










































United States 215 124 42% 149 68 54%
From Farm Economics (New York State College of Agriculture, Cornell Uni-
versity), No. i6o (April 1948), page 4137.
creasedsomewhat less than prices, according to estimates of the
Bureau of Agricultural Economics. In fact Iowa was the only
Corn Belt state where cash receipts decreased more than prices,
or where receipts decreased more than in the United States
generally (Tables '3 and '4).
Mortgage Experience
Compared with the Great Plains, where mortgage experience
was predominantly bad, the Corn Belt stands out as a region
TABLE 14
Cash Receipts from Farm Marketings in the
Corn Belt States, 1929 and 1932
(dollar figures in thousands)
Decrease





















TotalCornBelt $2,452,696 $1,033,594 58%
United States $11,302,889 $4,746,815
From Cash Receipts from Farming, by States and Commodities, Calendar
Years 1924-44(Bureauof Agricultural Economics, January 1946), Table 6, pages
37 f., 40f.,43 f., 56 f., and 6o f.THE CORN BELT 85
thousandfarms was 14.9 for Ohio, i8.g for Indiana, 20.3 for
Illinois, 27.6 for Missouri, and 30.7 for Iowa. These compare
with a high of 49.1 for South Dakota, and an average of 19.8
for the United States. County data on distress transfers in per-
cent of mortgaged farms (Figure 8, Chapter i) indicate the
same east to west variation in the Corn Belt. In Ohio, Indiana,
and Illinois, most of the Works Progress Administration sample
counties were in the 20-39 percent class interval, and the re-
mainder were in the 40-59 interval. In Iowa and Missouri, how-
ever, most of the counties were in the 40-59 and 60-79 percent
intervals, and three counties were in the 80-99 percent interval.
Probably the best single indicator of the location of distressed
areas within the several states of the Corn Belt is the experi-
ence of life insurance companies, which were very heavy lenders
throughout the region. They were much more active than the
land banks, for example. In 1930 the proportion of all farm
mortgages held by life insurance companies ranged from 21.7
percent in Ohio to 41.9 percent in Iowa. Land bank holdings
ranged from 6.8 percent in Iowa to 17.7 percent in Indiana.T
Distressed farm assets of a number of large life insurance
companies in 1929 and 1932, given as percentages of their total
farm investment, are shown in Figurefor counties and groups
of counties in the Corn Belt. The map for 1929 shows that at
that time serious difficulty had begun to develop in only a few
scattered areas. The most conspicuous of them was along the
Ohio River, particularly in southern Indiana. Another trouble
spot, which later became much worse, was northeastern Iowa.
In southern Iowa and nearby counties in northern Missouri
trouble was developing too.
By 1932 the pattern of distress had taken definite shape. The
southern Indiana area had increased somewhat and now in-
cluded adjacent counties in Illinois. But the most conspicuous
trouble spot was southern Iowa and northern Missouri, the
area already referred to in Chapter i, and designated G in
Figure 23(Chapter i). Mortgage difficulties in northeastern
Iowa had also expanded. In fact, high foreclosure rates had be-
come so general that the areas of relatively satisfactory experi-
ence began to stand out. Among them was the area comprising
central Illinois and parts of central Indiana and western Ohio
1' Harald C. Larsen, Distribution by Lender Groups of Farm-Mortgage and Real
Estate Holdings, January r, 1930-45 (Bureau of Agricultural Economics, August
1945),Tables17,i8,and 22,pp.6o, 62, and 68.86 THE CORN BELT
designated B in Figure 23. Other areas of fairly good experi-
ence were southeastern Nebraska and parts of westernMissouri.
Experience in the highly productive areas of central and west-
ern Iowa, while not good, stands out in contrast to the heavy
foreclosure rates for the remainder of the state.
For the most part insurance company losses proved heaviest
Figure 34. Loss Rates on Farms inandnearthe Corn Belt Sold by
13Life Insurance Companies,1929-37
in the areas where foreclosure rates were high. Actual loss ex-
perience for thirteen life insurance companies in the more im-
portant counties of the Corn Belt is shown in Figure34.8The
8Reportingcompanies provided the following data for acquired farms sold
during 1929-37:(i)capitalinvestment in acquired farms, including unpaid
principal of loan, interest, to date of acquisition, attorneys' fees, and other actual
expenses to date of acquisition; (2)costfrom acquisition to date of sale, includ-
ing maintenance, improvements, and taxes, less income; and receipts from
sales of acquired farms. Loss rates were determined by computing the percent
by which sales (item 3) failed to cover capital investment plus costs (itemsand







From unpublished data supplied by molar lifeinsurance companies. Loss roteis the
percentage by which receipts from soles failed to cover investment and costs. For cover-
age and other details see pages 40 to 43.THE CORN BELT 87
data reflect only completed sales of farms, of which there were
8,784 from 1929 to 1937 inclusive in the five major Corn Belt
states. This compares with 16,366 farms remaining to be sold
at the end of 1937.Naturally,the quality of the remaining
farms and the trend of land values during subsequent years
could have had a substantial effect on the ultimate loss rates.
Although the federal land banks had a smaller volume of
loans in the Corn Belt during the twenties than did life in-
surance companies, in the main they experienced difficulty in
the same areas. Land bank foreclosures and losses were heaviest
in southern Iowa and northern Missouri (Figures 9 and io,
Chapter i)andrelatively light in Ohio, central Indiana, and
northern and central Illinois.
Differences in farm mortgage distress between the eastern
and western Corn Belt states appear to have resulted largely
from differences in the intensity of the World War I specula-
tive boom. On the other hand, variations within states are closely
associated with local conditions affecting productivity, such as
soil quality, drainage, and topography. As was pointed out
earlier, the most conspicuously poor experience occurred in
three areas: southern Iowa and northern Missouri, northeastern
Iowa, and southern Indiana. Although it is difficult to believe
that the relatively low productivity of these areas was not clearly
recognized before and during the World War I boom, it seems
quite likely that the degree of inferiority was inadequately ap-
praised. As a result there was a tendency to overvalue land and
overextend credit.
For example, the roughness of topography and the scarcity
of good cropland in south central Iowa and north central
Missouri were readily apparent; moreover the relatively low
crop yields and the seriousness of the erosion hazard could not
have been entirely overlooked. Nevertheless, this poor area is
close to some of the best farming land in the nation. When the
World War I boom began to raise land values in the better
sections of Iowa, the inflation spread throughout most of the
surrounding fringe areas. All over Iowa, land values and debt
burdens reached heights that were not justified under normal
production and price conditions, but the overextension was
more extreme in the less productive areas. As a result, fore-
closures and losses were heaviest in such areas during the inter-
war period. This is illustrated by Table '.5, which includes
average corn yields, voluntary farm transfer rates in 1919-20,88 THE CORN BELT
TABLE
Distress Transfer Rates 1920-35, Voluntary Transfer





County 192o-35a 19j9.20b 1929-44C
Appanoose 89.3 21.8 31.5
Decatur 86.4 19.5 32.0
Jefferson 82.4 i6.g 39.9
Hamilton 78.5 16.7 50.9
Greene 72.1 17.5 47.8
Lucas 68.8 20.8
Woodbury 68.8 19.6 36.5
Clay 67.7 18.7 48.1
Humboldt 16.8 51.6
Monroe 64.9 17.0 33.2
Benton 59.8 12.2 52.5
Harrison 59.5 i8.o 36.0
Cass 54.0 18.7 41.8
Mitchell 53.7 17.7 44.2
Audubon 51.8 14.6 45.3
Delaware 49.5 i6.i 50.0
Des Moines 48.1 14.8 47.'
Cherokee 46.3 14.4 45.5
Cedar 38.7 '3.3 56.4
Calhoun i6.o 50.9
Buena Vista 34.8 17.1 50.1
Winneshiek 25.6 11.0 48.0
a Number of foreclosures, and assignments to avoid foreclosure, during 1920-
35' per hundred farms mortgaged in 1930. For sources and method of estimating
mortgaged farms by County, see pages 27 and 31, with footnotesand 4.
bAverage number of voluntary transfers in 1919-20 (from Transfers of Farm
Real Estate, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, mimeo., August 1939) per
hundred farms in 1920 as given in the 1920 Census of Agriculture.
c In bushels per acre; based on unpublished data supplied by the Bureau of
Agricultural Economics.
and foreclosure rates during the twenties and early thirties, in
WPA sample counties. At the peak of the World War I boom,
voluntary transfer rates were highest in counties with low corn
yields. In the aftermath, foreclosure rates were highest in thoseTHE CORN BELT 89
counties.° Feverish real estate activity apparently was accompa-
nied by failure on the part of both farmers and lenders to dis-
tinguish sufficiently between low-yield and high-yield corn land
with respect to long-term debt-carrying capacity.
It is important to note that the tendency to overvalue unpro-
ductive areas was not universal. Two very poor sections of the
Corn Belt states are southeastern Ohio and the Ozark area of
southern Missouri. There the productive limitations were suf-
ficiently obvious to be fully recognized. Both sections have
rough topography and poor soils; they are best suited for a
self-sufficient type of farming that neither needs nor can carry
much credit. Insurance companies made very few loans in either
area, and the experience of the land banks indicates that they
also were cautious lenders. Although WPA data for Ripley and
Reynolds counties in southeastern Missouri indicate numerous
distress transfers, experience there was no worse than in some
of the better areas of Missouri, or even in some of the best
counties of central Iowa.
9 This naturally raises the question whether the extremely poor experience in
counties like Appanoose, Decatur, and Jefferson was due primarily to low corn
yields, or primarily to speculative activity. In an effort to answer the question,
multiple correlation was applied to the three variables in Table With the
foreclosure rate as x1, the voluntary transfer rate asand the average corn
yield as x3, the multiple regression is
X1=23.2+3.426 X2_o.486 x3




are all statistically significant, and of roughly the same magnitude. The multiple
correlation coefficient
=+0.69
is very little higher than r12, suggesting that the combination of two variables in
the regression equation is little more effective than one of the variables taken
singly. The partial correlation coefficients are
=
—0.21
The coefficient r123, between foreclosures and voluntary transfers, is significant by
thepercent criterion; the coefficient r13•2, between foreclosures and corn yields,
is not significant. This may lend some small support to the view that excessive
speculation was the primary cause of distress in the poorer sections of Iowa.